Does a verified DPoP signature mean the request is accepted?
No. It proves only that the compact JWS matches the embedded public key. The receiving server still applies time, replay, nonce, token-binding, token-validity, and authorization policy.
Decode and verify DPoP proof JWTs, compare HTTP method, target URI, nonce, access-token hash, and embedded public-key binding without contacting a server.
Open your browser DevTools and the Network panel, optionally clear existing requests, then run the tool. Page assets or consent-based analytics may still load, but tool payloads, files, keys, and results are not sent for processing.
The proof and optional request context are processed in a disposable browser worker. Access tokens are used only to calculate ath and optional cnf.jkt comparisons and are not included in the result.
DecodeLens verifies the compact JWS with its embedded public JWK, calculates the RFC 7638 thumbprint and access-token hash, and keeps every supplied comparison as an independent result.
Continue with tools that decode, convert, inspect, or verify the same data.
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Open toolParse raw HTTP/1.x messages, inspect framing and multipart bodies, reconstruct HTTP signature bases, compare Content-Digest, and optionally verify supplied-key signatures.
Open toolParse JWT segments and inspect formatted Header, Payload, and Signature data locally.
Open toolInspect JWE and JWS Compact segments, JWK or JWKS keys, embedded certificates, and RFC 7638 thumbprints without fetching remote key URLs.
Open toolLoad the RFC example to verify its ES256 signature, compare GET and the query-free target URI, reproduce ath from the opaque access token, and review why the historical iat is outside today's local window.
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dC…
Authorization: DPoP Kz~8mXK1…signature: verified · htm: match · htu: match · ath: match · replay: not checkedNo. It proves only that the compact JWS matches the embedded public key. The receiving server still applies time, replay, nonce, token-binding, token-validity, and authorization policy.
RFC 9449 defines htu as the HTTP target URI without query and fragment. The supplied request URL is normalized to that comparison form.
It is held only in the current page and worker memory. DecodeLens calculates ath and, if it is JWT-shaped, reads only cnf.jkt for the optional key-binding comparison; the token is not returned or persisted.